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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”1 These ten words have frustrated scholars, 
lower courts, and at times, the U.S. Supreme Court itself.
2
 Confusion 
over the correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause recently 
manifested itself in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
3
 In 2010, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that a 
suburban school district’s practice of holding its graduation 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., May 2010, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  
1
 U.S. CONST. amend I.  
2
 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674-76 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Deciding cases on the basis of such an 
unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable with the imperative of applying 
neutral principles in constitutional adjudication.”). 
3
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2012). 
1
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ceremonies in a church comported with the Establishment Clause.
4
 On 
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
5
 The plaintiffs then filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc.
6
 The Seventh Circuit granted the 
petition and, sitting en banc, reversed the decision of the three-judge 
panel, finding that the school district’s practice of holding graduation 
in a church violated the Establishment Clause.
7
 Judge Ripple, Judge 
Posner, and Judge Easterbrook filed dissenting opinions.
8
  
This Comment will (1) provide a brief summary of current 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; (2) review graduation venue 
litigation prior to Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District; 
(3) analyze the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion; and 
(4) assert that the en banc opinion improperly applied the endorsement 
and coercion tests.  
 
I. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
A. Confusion in the Courts 
 
There is significant disagreement among federal courts and within 
the Supreme Court itself over how to correctly analyze cases that arise 
under the Establishment Clause.
9
 In 1992, a First Amendment expert 
                                                 
4
 Does 1, 7, 8, and 9, individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No. 
21, No. 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *15 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010) aff'd sub 
nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012). 
5
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 734 (7th Cir. 2011), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011). 
6
 Doe ex rel. Doe, 687 F.3d at 842. 
7
 Id. at 856.  
8
 Id. at 861, 869, 872. 
9
 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in 
hopeless disarray.”). 
2
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and former federal appellate judge said simply of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence: “It is a mess.”10 More 
recently, a scholar likened the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated attempts 
to formulate comprehensive Establishment Clause analyses to “a 
Creole chef continually tinkering with his recipe for jambalaya.”11 
Indeed, Justice Thomas himself once wrote, “[o]ur jurisprudential 
confusion [in Establishment Clause cases] has led to results that can 
only be described as silly.”12  
No case illustrates the Establishment Clause dilemma better than 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.
13
 In Allegheny, the plaintiff challenged 
the constitutionality of a nativity scene located inside a courthouse and 
a 45-foot Christmas tree and 18-foot menorah located in front of a 
government building.
14
 These simple facts spawned a 5-4 decision and 
four separate opinions, all interpreting the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence differently.
15
 Ultimately, the Court held that the 
nativity scene violated the Establishment Clause while the tree and 
menorah did not.
16
 Allegheny demonstrates the Court’s own struggle 
with the Establishment Clause and further complicates lower courts’ 
understanding of how to properly decide Establishment Clause cases. 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District further exemplifies this 
confusion through its improper application of the endorsement and 
coercion tests.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Michael W. McConnell, Exchange, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 
U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992). 
11
 Lynn S. Branham, “The Devil is in the Details”: A Continued Dissection of 
the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 412 
(2008). 
12
 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 n. 1 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
13
 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
14
 Id. at 579, 582-83. 
15
 Id. at 623-79. 
16
 Id. at 621. 
3
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B. The Three Establishment Clause Tests 
 
Courts use three tests to determine whether governmental action 
violates the Establishment Clause: (1) the Lemon test;
17
 (2) the 
endorsement test;
18
 and (3) the coercion test.
19
 The Court’s various 
attempts to simplify the application of the tests further convoluted the 
way federal district courts and federal courts of appeal utilized them to 
properly adjudicate cases arising under the Establishment Clause.
20
 
 
1. The Lemon Test 
 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a 
Pennsylvania statute that permitted salary subsidies for parochial 
school teachers.
21
 In its analysis, the Court applied a three-prong test 
that came to be known as the Lemon test.
 22
 To pass the Lemon test, the 
challenged governmental action must (1) “have a secular legislative 
purpose”; (2) have a “principal or primary effect . . . that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) “not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.”23 However, as one First 
Amendment scholar and former federal appellate judge noted, “[e]ach 
part of the Lemon test is deeply ambiguous . . . Consequently, the 
lower federal courts and state courts have given the test widely 
                                                 
17
 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
18
 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94. 
19
 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
20
 Erin R. Doyle, Casenotes, Endangering the Great Divide: Challenges to the 
Establishment Clause in Van Orden v. Perry, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 123, 130 (“[T]he 
Court’s inability to draw a consistent line has created convoluted and ambiguous 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
21
 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation omitted). 
4
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different and seemingly contradictory interpretations, and they often 
ignore it altogether to avoid undesirable results.”24 
 
a. Lemon’s First Prong: Secular Purpose 
 
To satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test, the challenged 
governmental action must have a secular purpose.
25
 However, in 
McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky,
26
 the Supreme Court stated that the challenged 
governmental action need not be exclusively secular; rather, it need 
only be predominantly secular.
27
 However, Judge Easterbrook, one of 
the dissenters in Doe,
28
 has severely criticized such an analysis.
29
 
Further, courts disagree as to whether they should examine the 
governmental action as a whole or focus solely on the religious 
component.
30
 While the Supreme Court has said that “[f]ocus[ing] 
exclusively on the religious component of any activity would 
inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause,”31 
the Court had not always adhered to this approach.
32
 For example, in 
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court examined an Alabama statute that 
authorized a moment of silence before each school day for 
                                                 
24
 Michael W. McConnell, Stuck with a Lemon: A new test for establishment 
clause cases would help ease current confusion, 83 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (Feb. 1997). 
25
 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
26
 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
27
 Id. at 860. 
28
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th Cir. 2012). 
29
 See Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“It would be appalling to conduct litigation under the 
Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with experts testifying about 
whether one display is really like another, and witnesses testifying they were 
offended—but would have been less so were the crèche five feet closer to the jumbo 
candy cane.”). 
30
 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 86 (1985) (J., Burger, dissenting). 
31
 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). 
32
 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58-59. 
5
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“‘meditation or voluntary prayer.’”33 In its analysis, the Court focused 
exclusively on the words “or voluntary prayer” because “the only 
significant . . . difference is the addition of the words ‘or voluntary 
prayer.’”34 Without clear direction from the Supreme Court, lower 
courts are left guessing whether to examine challenged government 
action as a whole or to only scrutinize the religious component. 
 
b. Lemon’s Second Prong: Principal Effect Must Not Advance 
or Inhibit Religion 
 
To satisfy Lemon’s second prong, governmental action must not 
have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
35
 This 
effect-based analysis is also fraught with problems. Specifically, “it 
fails to specify a baseline for comparison.”36 Lower courts are left to 
determine whether the “primary effect” of the challenged action 
“advanc[es] or inhibt[s] religion.”37 This becomes especially 
complicated when the challenged action contains both religious and 
secular components.
38
  
 
c. Lemon’s Third Prong: Excessive Entanglement 
 
To satisfy Lemon’s third prong, governmental action must not 
foster excessive entanglement with religion.
39
 The Lemon Court 
described “excessive entanglement” as government action that would 
result in “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
                                                 
33
 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (citing Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)). 
34
 Id. at 58-59. 
35
 Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
36
 McConnell, supra note 24. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. (McConnell elaborates, “If a government program extends benefits to a 
wide spectrum of private groups, secular as well as religious, does this ‘advance’ 
religion? The answer, according to the courts, is sometimes ‘yes,’ sometimes ‘no.’”). 
39
 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
6
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surveillance.”40 The Lemon Court explained that the excessive 
entanglement prong centers on the evaluation of three factors: (1) “the 
character and purposes of the institutions that . . . benefit[]” from the 
governmental action; (2) “the nature of the aid that the State provides” 
to religious institutions; and (3) “the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.”41 However, because all 
religious institutions necessarily maintain at least some form of 
contact with governmental entities, “there is no way to tell whether the 
entanglement is excessive.”42 As a result, “[t]he cases are all over the 
map.”43 
The Court’s inconsistent application of the Lemon test has brought 
the test under great scrutiny.
44
 Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test to 
a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave 
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.”45 
However, regardless of Scalia’s disdain for the Lemon test, because 
Lemon has not been expressly overruled, it is still binding precedent 
on lower courts.
46
  
 
2. The Endorsement Test 
 
Originally authored by Justice O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,47 
the endorsement test is essentially a narrower version of the second 
                                                 
40
 Id. at 619. 
41
 Id. at 615. 
42
 McConnell, supra note 24 at 47. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“When we wish to strike down a practice [the Lemon test] 
forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it 
entirely.” (citation omitted)).  
45
 Id. at 398. 
46
 Books v. Elkhart Cnty., Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Despite 
persistent criticism from several of the Justices, Lemon has not been overruled, and 
we are compelled to follow the approach it established.”). 
47
 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
7
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prong of the Lemon test.
48
 The endorsement test prohibits government 
entities “from conveying or attempting to convey a message that 
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”49 To 
satisfy the endorsement test, “an objective, reasonable observer, aware 
of the history and context of the community and forum in which the 
religious display appears,” must not “fairly understand the display to 
be a government endorsement of religion.”50 
However, Justice O’Connor further complicated the endorsement 
test in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.
51
 There, she laid 
out four additional factors which must be examined before concluding 
that governmental action violates the Establishment Clause: (1) history 
and ubiquity; (2) absence of worship or prayer; (3) absence of 
reference to a particular religion; and (4) minimal religious content.
52
 
She also asserted that judges must weigh the facts before them against 
the aforementioned factors to determine if the challenged 
governmental action conveys a message that religion or a religious 
belief is “favored” or “preferred.”53 
 
3. The Coercion Test 
 
The third and final test that the Supreme Court uses in 
Establishment Clause cases is the coercion test.
54
 The coercion test 
provides that “government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise.”55 However, in the context of 
                                                 
48
 Id. at 688-89. (“It has never been entirely clear, however, how the three parts 
of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause. 
Focusing on … endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an 
analytical device.”). 
49
 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (J., O’Connor, concurring 
opinion). 
50
 Books, 401 F.3d at 867 (internal quotation omitted). 
51
 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
52
 Id. at 37-43. 
53
 Id. at 34. 
54
 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
55
 Id. at 577. 
8
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public schools, the Supreme Court has only used the coercion test in 
cases involving formal religious exercises.
56
 For example, in Lee v. 
Weisman, the Supreme Court applied the coercion test where a rabbi 
led the attendees of a school graduation ceremony in a prayer 
complete with religious language including, “O God we are grateful to 
You,” “We give thanks to You,” and “AMEN.”57 The Court struck 
down the prayer because it coerced those present to participate in a 
religious exercise.
58
 Similarly, in Santa Fe Independent School District 
v. Doe, the Supreme Court applied the coercion test where a student 
chaplain led a crowd in prayer over a school’s public address system 
prior to home football games.
59
 Because the prayers were “infused 
with explicit references to Jesus Christ and . . . appeal[ed] to 
distinctively Christian beliefs,” the Court found that it coerced those 
present to participate in a religious exercise.
60
 
 
II. GRADUATION LITIGATION PRIOR TO DOE EX REL 
DOE 
 
Only a few cases have directly addressed the constitutionality of 
holding graduation ceremonies in religiously affiliated buildings.
61
 In 
1916, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard a challenge to a school 
district’s practice of holding graduation in local churches.62 Because 
the court found that “[t]he holding of graduation exercises in a church 
                                                 
56
 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 480-81 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub 
nom. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
57
 505 U.S. at 581-82. 
58
 Id. at 599.  
59
 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299 (2000). 
60
 Id. at 299 n.7. 
61
 Christine Rienstra Kiracofe, Going to the Chapel, and We’re 
Gonna…Graduate?: Do Public Schools Run Afoul of the Constitution by Holding 
Graduation Ceremonies in Church Buildings? 266 Educ. L. Rep. 583, 589 (2011). 
62
 State ex rel. Conway v. Dist. Bd. of Joint Sch. Dist. No. 6 of Towns of 
Plymouth, Wonewoc, and City of Elroy, 156 N.W. 477, 480 (Wis. 1916). 
9
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is not in itself the giving of sectarian instruction,” it held that the 
district had not violated Wisconsin’s state constitution.63 
In 1952, the New Mexico Supreme Court heard a challenge to a 
school district’s practice of holding graduation in a Presbyterian 
church.
64
 Noting that “[t]he churches were the only buildings in 
the . . . community with sufficient seating capacity to accommodate 
the pupils and the people of the community,”65 the court held that the 
practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.
66
 
In 1974, the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin—the same court that decided Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook 
School District—heard Lemke v. Black.67 In Lemke, the court found 
that a school district’s practice of holding graduation at a Roman 
Catholic church violated the Establishment Clause because the school 
district failed to show “an overriding secular need to use those 
particular facilities.”68 However, the District Court’s decision was 
subsequently vacated on appeal as moot.
69
 
In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut 
decided Does v. Enfield Public Schools.
70
 There, students and parents 
challenged the district’s practice of holding high school graduation 
ceremonies at a Christian church.
71
 The Enfield court focused on the 
issues of endorsement, coercion, and excessive entanglement with 
religion.
72
 With respect to endorsement, the court found that a 
reasonable observer would likely believe that “holding . . . graduations 
at First Cathedral constitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion 
because it conveys the message that certain religious views are 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 480-81. 
64
 Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 356 (1952). 
65
 Id. at 356. 
66
 Id. at 357. 
67
 376 F.Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
68
 Id. at 89. 
69
 Lemke v. Black, 525 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1975). 
70
 716 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2010). 
71
 Id. at 175. 
72
 Id. at 185-202. 
10
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embraced by Enfield Schools, and others are not.”73 With respect to 
coercion, the court found that, “by requiring a graduating senior—or a 
parent of one—to enter First Cathedral in order to be able to 
participate in his or her graduation—or to watch their child graduate—
Enfield Public Schools has coerced plaintiffs to support religion.”74 
And with respect to excessive entanglement, the court found that the 
school district’s modifications of the physical interior of the church 
constituted excessive entanglement of religion.
75
 
Thus, different courts have emphasized vastly different aspects of 
the practice of holding public graduation ceremonies in religious 
buildings. While some courts emphasize practicality, such as the New 
Mexico Supreme Court’s recognition of inadequate alternative spaces 
for the graduation ceremonies
76
, others, such as the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, focus intensely on the 
religiousness of the space itself.
77
  
Further, courts give varying weight to the endorsement, coercion, 
and Lemon tests. Like the Enfield court, an intense scrutiny on the 
religious components of the interior, physical components of the 
church would formed the basis for the Seventh Circuit’s en banc 
opinion in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District.
78
 
 
                                                 
73
 Id. at 188-89. 
74
 Id. at 201. 
75
 Id. at 198-99. 
76
 Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355 (1952). 
77
 716 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2010). 
78
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2012); 
716 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2010). 
11
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III. DOE EX REL. DOE V. ELMBROOK SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Elmbrook School District is located in Brookfield, Wisconsin, a 
western suburb of Milwaukee.
79
 The District has two high schools, 
Brookfield Central and Brookfield East.
80
 In 2000, Brookfield Central 
began holding its graduation ceremony in the main sanctuary of 
Elmbrook Church, a non-denominational, evangelical Christian 
church; Brookfield East followed suit in 2002.
81
 Additionally, 
Brookfield Central rented a smaller room in the Church for its senior 
honors night.
82
 
The original idea to hold Brookfield Central’s graduation 
ceremony in the Church came from the officers of the senior class of 
2000.
83
 They believed the current venue, the school’s gymnasium, was 
“too hot, cramped, and uncomfortable.”84 Further, “those attending 
were packed in; they had to sit on hard wooden bleachers or folding 
chairs; and there was no air conditioning.”85 The student officers 
proposed the idea to hold graduation in the church, which “had more 
comfortable seats, air conditioning and ample free parking,” to the 
District Superintendent and the entire senior class.
86
 The senior class 
subsequently voted in favor of the proposal.
87
 The Principal made the 
final decision to use the Church, and the Superintendent approved.
88
  
                                                 
79
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 734 (7th Cir. 2011), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011). 
80
 Id. 
81
 Id. at 713. 
82
 Id.  
83
 Id.  
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. at 734. 
86
 Id.  
87
 Id.  
88
 Id. 
12
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A similar process took place at Brookfield East in 2002.
89
 
Between 2002 and 2005, the senior class voted to choose between two 
or three venues, one of which was always the church.
90
 Each time, the 
Church “invariably emerged the overwhelming favorite.”91 In 2006, 
the principals of the schools discontinued the “pointless” voting 
process and continued holding graduation at the Church.
92
 The Church 
charged the School District a “standard rate” between $2,000.00 and 
$2,200.00 for each graduation ceremony.
93
 
The atmosphere of the Church itself was unsurprisingly dominated by 
Christian imagery and symbols.
94
 Crosses and other religious symbols 
could be found on the exterior and interior of the Church.
95
 Upon 
entering the Church, visitors passed through the Church lobby, which 
contained tables and stations holding evangelical literature and 
pamphlets, some of which were titled “young adults,” “couples 
ministry,” “middle school ministry,” “high school ministry,” and 
“college ministry.”96 Church personnel manned these stations during 
the 2002 and 2009 graduation ceremonies; in fact, in 2002 they passed 
out religious literature during the ceremony.
97
 
The ceremony itself took place at the front of the Church, where a 
large Latin cross was fixed to the wall and hung over the dais.
98
 While 
the Church refused to veil the cross during the ceremony, it did agree 
to remove all non-permanent religious symbols from the dais.
99
 During 
the ceremony, graduating seniors sat in the front and center rows of 
                                                 
89
 Id.  
90
 Id.  
91
 Id. 
92
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 687 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
93
 Id. at 714. 
94
 Id. at 715. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. at 714-15. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 734. 
99
 Id.  
13
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pews of the Church’s main level, while guests sat in other pews.100 
Bibles and hymnal books remained in the pews, as well as other 
religious literature such as a donation envelope and a yellow “Scribble 
Card for God’s Little Lambs.”101 
Objections to the District’s decision to hold the graduation 
ceremony at the Church began in 2001, one year after the first 
ceremony was held at the Church.
102
 Over the years, parents, non-
profit organizations and interest groups objected to holding graduation 
at the Church.
103
 In response to these objections, the Superintendent 
often noted that the District was in the process of obtaining funding for 
a new field house and for renovations to the school’s gymnasium, and 
that the school could host its graduation ceremony in either location. 
After several efforts to obtain funding failed, the District finally 
obtained the necessary funds to build a new field house.
104
After the 
field house was completed in 2010, both high schools moved their 
graduation ceremonies to the field house.
105
 
The plaintiffs in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District are 
current and former non-Christian students of Elmbrook School 
District.
106
 They “felt uncomfortable, upset, offended, unwelcome, 
and/or angry” because of the intense religious atmosphere inside and 
outside of the Church.
107
 The plaintiffs alleged that there were 
alternative, religiously neutral venues that would have sufficed for the 
graduation ceremony; though the School District contended none were 
as attractive as the Church for the price.
108
  
 
                                                 
100
 Id.  
101
 Id. at 715. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. at 715-17. 
104
 Id. at 734. 
105
 Id.  
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. at 717. 
108
 Id. 
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B. The District Court’s Decision 
 
Noting that “the [Supreme] Court has sidestepped Lemon in 
several Establishment Clause cases,”109 the District Court used the 
coercion test, the endorsement test, and the excessive entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test and found no constitutional violation.
110
 
In its coercion test analysis, the District Court found that the 
School District did not impermissibly coerce graduation ceremony 
attendees.
111
 The coercion test prohibits governmental entities from 
coercing individuals to participate in religion or religious exercises.
112
 
In Lee v. Weisman
113
 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe,
114
 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the practice of reading a 
prayer before a high school graduation ceremony and football games, 
respectively. The District Court in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School 
District distinguished Lee and Santa Fe because this case involves 
“exposure to religious symbols” as opposed to “coerced religious 
participation.”115  
Regarding the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test, 
the court in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District noted that the 
School District maintained complete control of the graduation 
ceremonies, limited its interaction with the Church to arranging the 
                                                 
109
 Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No. 21, 
No. 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *7 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010) aff'd sub nom. 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe ex 
rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012). 
110
 Id. at *15. 
111
 Id. at *10. 
112
 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
113
 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
114
 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
115
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 658 F.3d at 710, 718 (quoting 
Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually, 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *9 (E.D. Wis. July 
19, 2010) aff'd sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th 
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 
2012)). 
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rental, attempted to have non-permanent religious items removed from 
the Church, and in no way delegated its authority to the Church.
116
 
Thus, the court found no violation under the Lemon test.
117
 
In its endorsement analysis, the court “‘assess[ed] the totality of 
the circumstances’ surrounding the event to determine whether an 
‘objective, reasonable observer, aware of the history and context of the 
community and forum’ would fairly understand the event to be a 
government endorsement of religion.”118 Ultimately, the Seventh 
Circuit found that the School District’s decision to hold graduation 
ceremonies in a church “holds symbolic force,”119 but that a 
reasonable observer who understood the reasons for holding 
graduation in the Elmbrook Church, namely the adequate space, 
modern amenities, close location, and reasonable cost, would not 
understand the decision to constitute an endorsement of religion.
120
 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Three-Judge Panel Decision 
 
The three-judge panel that heard Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook 
School District on appeal was comprised of Judge Ripple, Judge 
Flaum, and Chief Judge Easterbrook.
121
 Judge Ripple wrote the 
majority opinion in which Chief Judge Easterbrook joined.
122
 Judge 
                                                 
116
 Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually, 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *14 (E.D. 
Wis. July 19, 2010) aff'd sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 
710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
117
 Id. 
118
 Id. at *11 (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cnty, Ind,. 401 F.3d 857, 866-67 (7th 
Cir. 2005). 
119
 Id. at *13. 
120
 Id. at *12-13. 
121
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2011). 
122
 Id. 
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Flaum’s dissenting opinion formed the basis for what would later be 
the en banc opinion for the entire Seventh Circuit.
123
 
The majority opinion conducted its Establishment Clause analysis 
in two parts: coercion and endorsement.
124
 Regarding coercion, the 
majority found that “the Establishment Clause does not shield citizens 
from encountering the beliefs or symbols of any faith to which they do 
not subscribe” and that “graduates are not forced—even subtly—to 
participate in any religious exercise.”125 The court also noted that the 
attendees of the graduation ceremony are not forced to take pamphlets 
or to sit through attempts at proselytization and that the encounter with 
religion is “purely passive and incidental to attendance at an entirely 
secular ceremony.”126 Thus, the court found that the passive religious 
iconography present in Elmbrook Church did not coerce those present 
to participate in religion or religious exercise.
127
 
Regarding endorsement, the court asked whether “a reasonable 
person, apprised of the circumstances surrounding the [practice]” and 
“familiar with the history of the government practice at issue” would 
understand the graduation ceremony to endorse religion.
128
 Noting that 
the church was rented at the suggestion of the graduates themselves, 
the court found that “an objective observer would understand the 
religious symbols and messages in the [Church] and on Church 
grounds to be part of the underlying setting as the District found it 
rather than as an expression of adherence or approval by the 
school.”129 
                                                 
123
 Id. at 734-40; Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District 687 F.3d 840, 
842-56. (7th Cir. 2012). 
124
 Id. at 725-34. 
125
 Id. at 727 (internal citations omitted). 
126
 Id.  
127
 Id. at 728-29. 
128
 Id. at 730 (quoting Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 
523, 528 (7th Cir. 2009). 
129
 Id. at 731. 
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Thus, the three-judge panel found no coercion and no 
endorsement of religion and therefore held the practice of holding the 
graduation ceremonies in Elmbrook Church constitutional.
130
 
 
D. The Seventh Circuit’s En Banc Decision 
 
Similar to the District Court of Connecticut in Enfield, the 
Seventh Circuit focused its analysis on endorsement and coercion in 
its en banc decision in Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District. 
 
1. The En Banc Panel’s Endorsement Analysis 
 
The en banc decision in Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School 
District found that holding the graduation ceremony in Elmbrook 
Church impermissibly endorsed religion.
131
 Several facts contributed 
to this finding: “a 15 to 20 foot tall Latin cross,” the passing out of 
religious pamphlets, a poster depicting pop culture icons next to Jesus, 
religious banners hanging from the ceiling, and pews supplied with 
Bibles, hymnals, and other religious literature.
132
 In general, the court 
found that the “sheer religiosity of the space created a likelihood that 
high school students and their younger siblings would perceive a link 
between church and state.”133 
 
2. The En Banc Panel’s Coercion Analysis 
 
The en banc decision found that holding the graduation ceremony 
in Elmbrook Church “carried an impermissible aspect of coercion.”134 
Specifically, the en banc panel found that holding graduation in the 
Elmbrook Church was coercive for two reasons. First, present in this 
case was the concern from Lee v. Weisman that “graduation 
                                                 
130
 Id. at 734. 
131
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 852 (7th Cir. 2012). 
132
 Id. at 852-53. 
133
 Id. at 853. 
134
 Id. at 856. 
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ceremonies were effectively obligatory even if attendance was 
technically voluntary.”135 And given that graduation ceremonies were 
obligatory, the Elmbrook School District violated the principle that 
“‘[n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his 
will.’”136 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EN BANC 
OPINION 
 
A. The Court Expands, Without Precedent, the Possibility of 
Finding Unconstitutional Government Endorsement/Coercion 
by the Religiousness of a Particular Space 
 
The Supreme Court has never found that a school that attempted 
to decrease the degree of religiousness of a particular space violated 
the Establishment Clause.
137
 The majority decision thus expands the 
concepts of coercion and endorsement of religion into a new realm of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While each Establishment Clause 
case “calls for line drawing” and “no fixed, per se rule can be 
framed,”138 the majority decision in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook 
School District applies the coercion and endorsement tests in an 
entirely new way. 
Indeed, the majority mistakes previous Supreme Court precedent 
where schools increased the religiousness of a previously secular 
space to the facts of this case, where the school district attempted to 
decrease the religiousness of a previously religious space. The 
majority wrote, “If . . . a school cannot create a pervasively religious 
environment in the classroom . . . it appears overly formalistic to allow 
                                                 
135
 Id. at 854. 
136
 Id. at 855 (alteration in original) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing 
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
137
 A review of Establishment Clauses cases involving schools yielded findings 
of unconstitutionality only where schools used religion in a certain way or interacted 
with a religious institution. 
138
 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). 
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a school to engage in identical practices when it acts through a short-
term lease.”139 There, the Seventh Circuit misstated what Elmbrook 
School District did in this case. Elmbrook School District did not 
“create a pervasively religious environment” but rather, the District 
temporarily leased an already-existing religious space for the use of a 
completely secular activity while removing as much of the religious 
iconography and imagery as possible.
140
 This case would be very 
different if Elmbrook School District increased the religiousness 
inside the Church. But that is not what occurred here. Conversely, the 
administration of Elmbrook School District tried to make the 
atmosphere of the church as religiously-neutral as possible; a fact the 
Seventh Circuit overlooked in its analysis. 
 
B. The Majority Improperly Applies the Endorsement Test by not 
using the “Reasonable Observer” Standard 
 
In its endorsement analysis, the Seventh Circuit did not ask 
whether a reasonable observer would perceive holding graduation 
inside Elmbrook Church as an endorsement of religion.
141
 Rather, the 
Seventh Circuit wrote, “[r]egardless of the purpose of school 
administrators in choosing the location, the sheer religiosity of the 
space created a likelihood that high school students and their younger 
siblings would perceive a link between church and state. That is, the 
activity conveyed a message of endorsement.”142 Justice O’Connor, 
the author of the endorsement test, expressly rejected this form of 
subjective analysis.
143
 In Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow, she wrote: 
 
                                                 
139
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District 687 F.3d 840, 856. (internal 
citations omitted). 
140
 Id. at 846. 
141
 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 1824 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring) 
(“The endorsement test views a challenged display through the eyes of a 
hypothetical reasonable observer.”). 
142
 Id. at 853 (emphasis added). 
143
 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 34-35 (2004). 
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Nearly any government action could be overturned as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause if a “heckler’s 
veto” sufficed to show that its message was one of 
endorsement. ‘There is always someone who, with a 
particular quantum of knowledge, reasonably might 
perceive a particular action as an endorsement of 
religion.”144 
 
Thus, by conducting its analysis through the eyes of the high 
school students and their younger siblings, the Seventh Circuit 
engaged in the exactly opposite type of analysis that the “reasonable 
observer” standard requires: whether “an objective, reasonable 
observer, aware of the history and context of the community and forum 
in which the religious display appears, would fairly understand the 
display to be a government endorsement of religion.”145 
 
C. The En Banc Opinion Improperly Applies the Coercion Test  
 
The majority used the coercion test in its analysis of Doe ex. rel. 
Doe v. Elmbrook School District.
146
 However use of the coercion test 
was inappropriate in this case, and furthermore, the court conducted 
the test improperly. First, in the context of public schools, the coercion 
test has only been applied to cases involving formal religious 
exercises.
147
 For instance, in Lee, the Court applied the coercion test to 
a high school’s practice of reading a prayer at its graduation 
ceremony
148
 and in Santa Fe, the Court applied the coercion test to a 
high school’s practice of reading a prayer over the public 
                                                 
144
 Id. at 35 (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753, 780 (1995)). 
145
 Books v. Elkhart Cnty. Ind, 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotations omitted).  
146
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 854-56 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
147
 Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2010). 
148
 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
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announcement system before a football game.
149
 Thus, even applying 
the coercion test to Elmbrook constituted a departure from 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has limited its application. 
Second, the Seventh Circuit relied on its finding of “government 
endorsement” to subsequently find that such “endorsement” also 
constituted coercion of religion.
150
 In support of this reasoning, the 
majority cites Wallace v. Jaffree.
151
 However, because Wallace 
involved a statute authorizing students to use a moment of silence for 
prayer, a formal religious exercise,
152
 the majority’s reliance on 
Wallace to distinguish it from Lee and Santa Fe is unconvincing. 
Further, the en banc opinion of Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook 
School District blurs the line between the endorsement and coercion 
tests. In its opinion, the majority states, “the practice of holding high 
school graduation ceremonies in the Elmbrook Church sanctuary 
conveys an impermissible message of endorsement. Under the 
circumstances here, the message of endorsement carried an 
impermissible aspect of coercion.”153 However, as Judge Easterbrook 
notes in his dissenting opinion, “the majority does not explain how 
endorsement coerces.”154 And indeed, it is difficult to reconcile cases 
like Lee and Santa Fe where prayers were read aloud at a graduation 
ceremony and a high school football game,
155
 with the fact that the 
Elmbrook School District’s entire graduation ceremony was secular in 
nature.
156
 
 
                                                 
149
 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299 (2000). 
150
 687 F.3d at 856. 
151
 Id. at 855 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)). 
152
 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). 
153
 Id. at 856. 
154
 687 F.3d at 870 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
155
 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 
530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
156
 687 F.3d at 842. 
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D. The En Banc Opinion Leaves No Room for Practicality 
 
Suppose that Elmbrook School District was not located in a 
suburb of Milwaukee, but was instead located in a rural part of central 
Wisconsin where Elmbrook Church was the only space that could 
adequately and comfortably hold the graduation ceremony attendees. 
Would the “pervasively religious” atmosphere of the Church still 
constitute government endorsement and coercion of religion if it were 
the only available option? Unlike the analysis conducted by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court in Miller v. Cooper,
157
 the majority opinion 
does not leave room for this possibility, nor does it acknowledge the 
rigidity of its holding. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record 
showing the inadequate functionality of the school’s gymnasium.158 
While the en banc opinion acknowledged this fact in the “Facts” 
section,
159
 it failed to consider it in its analysis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Without clear direction from the U.S. Supreme Court, courts are 
left guessing how to correctly apply the Lemon, coercion, and 
endorsement tests. The inconsistent results between the District Court, 
three-judge panel, and en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit in Doe ex 
rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District exemplify this principle. Courts 
engage in exhaustive analyses, but are left with inconsistent and 
                                                 
157
 56 N.M. 355 (1952). 
158
 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 844 n.2 (“In 
September 1999, the senior class officers sent a letter to Superintendent Gibson 
making their case for the Church: ‘We request that the site of the ceremony be 
changed to an auditorium in Elmbrook Church . . . The seating in the Brookfield 
Central Gymnasium is very limited, causing the atmosphere to be very busy and 
perhaps even chaotic. On top of the crowding, the temperature in the Gymnasium 
gets extremely hot in the month of June. We feel that the Elmbrook Church will 
overcome the limitations of space and temperature control, providing ample 
comfortable seating and an air-conditioned room. The cushioned seats are also much 
more comfortable in comparison to the hard, wooden bleachers available at 
school.’). 
159
 Id. at 844. 
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conflicting results. Here, the Seventh Circuit’s endorsement analysis 
took on a subjective viewpoint and its coercion analysis was stretched 
beyond the area of a religious exercise. Until the U.S. Supreme Court 
either formulates a comprehensive Establishment Clause analysis or 
directly addresses the constitutionality of holding graduation 
ceremonies in religious venues, it is likely that courts will continue to 
make inconsistent rulings.  
24
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